A combination of social forces has thrown marriage into question in westernised societies at the end of the millennium. This uncertainty creates space for new ways of thinking about marriage. In this context, we examine the idea of marriage as friendship. We trace its genealogy in the work of Mary Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor and then subject it to critical scrutiny using some of Michel de Montaigne’s ideas. We ask how applicable the ideal of higher friendship is (...) to marriage and what might be gained and lost by a synthesis of marriage and friendship. Grounding the discussion in historical sources is valuable because the topic is so little explored in the contemporary philosophical literature. This approach also allows any enduring value in these historical texts to be elicited. (shrink)

I present an annotated development of the basic ideas of the Geneva School approach to the foundations of physics and the structures which emerge as mathematical representations of the physically dual notions of state and property.

Supertasks recently discussed in the literature purport to display a failure ofenergy conservation and determinism in Newtonian mechanics. We debatewhether these supertasks are admissible as Newtonian systems, with Earmanand Norton defending the affirmative and Alper and Bridger the negative.

In his exemplary edition of the papyrus fragments of Callimachus' Victoria Berenices, P. J. Parsons briefly considered the spelling of the name of Hercules' host, who played such a major role in Callimachus' ατιον on the founding of the Nemean games. At B iii 2 the papyrus has M[λ]ορκοϲ. On this Professor Parsons noted ‘elsewhere Mλορχοϲ: the unusual spelling, which no doubt comes from the text, reappears in Apollodorus, Bibl. 2.5.1 , Nonnus, Dion. 17.52 and Stephanus of Byzantium s.v. Mολορκα (...) ’. (shrink)

In his exemplary edition of the papyrus fragments of Callimachus' Victoria Berenices, P. J. Parsons briefly considered the spelling of the name of Hercules' host, who played such a major role in Callimachus' ατιον on the founding of the Nemean games. At B iii 2 the papyrus has M[λ]ορκοϲ. On this Professor Parsons noted ‘elsewhere Mλορχοϲ: the unusual spelling, which no doubt comes from the text, reappears in Apollodorus, Bibl. 2.5.1, Nonnus, Dion. 17.52 and Stephanus of Byzantium s.v. Mολορκα ’.

Let your verse be the happy occurrenceSomehow within the restless morning windWhich goes about smelling of mint and thyme...And all the rest is literature.It's not lIterary unless it's depressing. Although this statement is unfounded, I often hear it from beginning students and nonacademics who believe that literature is always dark and dreary, and that literariness is tantamount to depictions of suffering, struggle, and tragedy. I typically respond to such comments in the usual English-professor way, pointing out that literature represents the (...) full range of human experience, and that the subject matter is far less important than the way in which a writer describes it. What is more, I say to such people... (shrink)

caue, caue; namque in malos asperrimus parata tollo cornua, qualis Lycambae spretus infido gener aut acer hostis Bupalo. an, si quis atra dente me petiuerit, inultus ut flebo puer? Harrison observes that commentators translate ‘“inultus” not “unavenged” but “without taking revenge”, construing it with Horace as the subject of “flebo” and not with “puer”’, and he then asserts ‘This use of “inultus” is wholly unparalleled; the adjective is elsewhere always used passively of persons or objects unavenged and never in the (...) active sense of “unavenging”’. (shrink)

caue, caue; namque in malos asperrimus parata tollo cornua, qualis Lycambae spretus infido gener aut acer hostis Bupalo. an, si quis atra dente me petiuerit, inultus ut flebo puer? Harrison observes that commentators translate ‘“inultus” not “unavenged” but “without taking revenge”, construing it with Horace as the subject of “flebo” and not with “puer”’, and he then asserts ‘This use of “inultus” is wholly unparalleled; the adjective is elsewhere always used passively of persons or objects unavenged and never in the (...) active sense of “unavenging”’. (shrink)

In lines 5–8 of his 95th poem Catullus contrasts the everlasting world-wide fame which P. Helvius Cinna's Smyrna will enjoy with the quick death which Volusius' I Annales will suffer before they get beyond the Po.

In lines 5–8 of his 95th poem Catullus contrasts the everlasting world-wide fame which P. Helvius Cinna's Smyrna will enjoy with the quick death which Volusius' I Annales will suffer before they get beyond the Po.

Presumably it is common ground that this verb has in addition to the basic sense ‘recognize’ the derivative sense ‘oread’, and that one must judge from the context whether reading to one or more other people, or private reading, is meant. The reading of the text of a law to a jury at an orator's request is marked by the circumstances themselves as public reading; so is the reading of the Athenian decree to the Mitylenaeans in Thucydides. When Theaetetus answers (...) in the affirmative the question whether he has read the book of Protagoras which contains the statement that man is the measure of all things (); or when it is asked ‘Why is it that some people, if they begin to read, are overcome by sleep even against their will, whereas others wishing to be overcome by sleep are kept awake by taking up a book?’ Evidently what is intended is reading in the privacy of one's own room. When Socrates in the Phaedo says that he heard a person reading from Anaxagoras and eagerly took the book home to read , both senses are found within a few pages. (shrink)

Oxford Scholarly Classics brings together a number of great academic works from the archives of Oxford University Press. Reissued in a uniform series design, they will enable libraries, scholars, and students to gain fresh access to some of the finest scholarship of the last century.

Presumably it is common ground that this verb has in addition to the basic sense ‘recognize’ the derivative sense ‘oread’, and that one must judge from the context whether reading to one or more other people, or private reading, is meant. The reading of the text of a law to a jury at an orator's request is marked by the circumstances themselves as public reading; so is the reading of the Athenian decree to the Mitylenaeans in Thucydides. When Theaetetus answers (...) in the affirmative the question whether he has read the book of Protagoras which contains the statement that man is the measure of all things (); or when it is asked ‘Why is it that some people, if they begin to read, are overcome by sleep even against their will, whereas others wishing to be overcome by sleep are kept awake by taking up a book?’ Evidently what is intended is reading in the privacy of one's own room. When Socrates in the Phaedo says that he heard a person reading from Anaxagoras and eagerly took the book home to read, both senses are found within a few pages. (shrink)

D J O’Connor; Two Concepts of Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 16, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 137–146, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.

D J O’Connor; Two Concepts of Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 16, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 137–146, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.

D J O’Connor; Two Concepts of Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 16, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 137–146, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.